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♪ ♪ KATKO: Welcome, America, to "Balancing Act", the show that aims to tame the political circus of two-party politics.

I'm John Katko.

This week, the Monroe Doctrine.

Is it still a legitimate guide for U.S.

foreign policy?

In the center ring, Sarah Daly, professor of Political Science at Columbia University, gives us a history lesson and analysis.

On the trapeze, University of Missouri historian Jay Sexton and Heritage Foundation Policy Analyst Andre Martinez Fernandez discuss whether the president should still utilize a Monroe Doctrine or even the "Donroe Doctrine."

Plus, I'll give you My Take.

But first, let's walk the tightrope.

♪ ♪ President Trump's actions in Venezuela have reignited the debate over what the Monroe Doctrine is and what it should be.

In truth, the Monroe Doctrine is one of the oldest ideas in American foreign policy, and perhaps, one of the most misunderstood.

To begin with, it's not a law, and it's not part of the Constitution.

It was never passed by Congress, and it carries no automatic legal authority.

Monroe Doctrine, instead, is a policy principle, backed by American power and presidential interpretation that has existed in four major versions.

The original version began way back in 1823 when President James Monroe warned European powers that the Western Hemisphere was no longer open to colonization.

Any attempt to extend Europe's political influence into the Americas would be viewed as a threat to the United States' peace and security.

In return, the United States pledged to stay out of Europe's affairs.

The second version came in 1904, when then President Teddy Roosevelt added what was known as the Roosevelt Corollary.

He argued that the United States could intervene in Latin America to prevent instability from inviting European powers back into the hemisphere.

Version 3 arrived in 1933, when President Franklin Roosevelt introduced the Good Neighbor policy.

The U.S.

rejected unilateral intervention and emphasized diplomacy, trade, and respect for sovereignty.

The doctrine was not abandoned; its application was restrained.

That restraint faded after World War II.

The fourth version emerged during the Cold War, beginning in the late 1940s.

U.S.

policy shifted towards limiting Soviet influence in the Western Hemisphere.

There was no formal rewrite, only unofficial interpretations that stretched the doctrine to the breaking point, and that is where the debate widens.

Critics argue the Monroe Doctrine helped normalize the idea that presidents can set foreign policy unilaterally, without Congress.

Critics also argue that it's been used by presidents past and present to justify interventionist actions - a debate that extends far beyond the Americas and into the modern era.

Under President Donald Trump, the United States' capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has reignited debate over what some have dubbed the "Donroe Doctrine."

No matter the name or the version, the question remains the same: Is the Monroe Doctrine still a legitimate guide for U.S.

foreign policy?

Let's discuss that with our expert in the center ring.

♪ ♪ Joining me now is Sarah Daly, professor of Political Science at Columbia University.

Welcome, Sarah, and let's get right into the discussion about the origins of the Monroe Doctrine.

The original impetus behind the Monroe Doctrine was to stop colonization.

Was that a real issue and a real threat back in the day of President Monroe?

DALY: Thank you, John, it's my pleasure to be here.

So the Monroe Doctrine dates back to 1823 when President James Monroe told Congress that any European attempt to extend influence in the Americas would be considered, in his words, "dangerous to our peace and safety."

But I think it's really important to understand that the doctrine's meaning has constantly evolved.

So under Teddy Roosevelt, it became the Roosevelt Corollary, which was a justification for intervention.

During the Cold War, it was invoked against communism.

Kennedy demanded Soviet missiles be withdrawn from Cuba.

Reagan opposed the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.

Interventions in Guatemala, in Chile, in the Dominican Republic were all justified under the umbrella.

So that's sort of the big picture history up through the Cold War.

KATKO: So at some point, did we kind of take our eye off the ball with respect to the intent behind the Monroe Doctrine, and that is kind of being stewards of the Western Hemisphere, making sure there's no encroachment?

DALY: Absolutely, I think that after the Cold War, the U.S.

essentially stopped paying attention to Latin America.

Post-9/11, all of our focus went to the Middle East, to Central Asia, to counterterrorism.

At a certain point, Colombian President Manuel Santos actually complained publicly - I think was 2011-that U.S.

policy toward the region was, in his words, "passive and disengaged."

By 2013, Secretary Kerry declared that the era of the Monroe Doctrine is over.

KATKO: What do you think about that?

Is it over, or was it over at that point, essentially?

DALY: I think that this disengagement really allowed two issues, two crises, to metastasize.

So first, China quietly became South America's largest trading partner.

Twenty-one countries in the region have joined the Belt and Road.

This has brought ports and infrastructure, billions in loans.

China has flipped diplomatic recognition away from Taiwan across the region.

Latin America holds the world's largest lithium reserves, which is critical for defense technology, the most copper.

So this meant that Chinese controlling this infrastructure, it's not just an economic irritant to the U.S.

; it's really affecting U.S.

supply chains and security.

KATKO: I'm glad you brought up the Belt and Road Initiative I'm sorry, go ahead, please.

DALY: Yeah, no, no, I was just going to say that the other huge crisis that developed during this period was that criminal violence exploded.

Latin America became the world's most violent region.

8% of the world's population, over 30% of its homicides.

You know, this has been very well documented with Mexico's war drug war escalating, Venezuela incubating Nicaragua and its prisons.

And this violence, obviously, has bled north with migration, with fentanyl, with the Mexican cartels receiving precursor chemicals from China and flooding the U.S market with fentanyl, which in 2023, killed over 100,000 Americans.

KATKO: Okay, so let's break this out because I'm glad you brought the Belt and Road initiative because a lot of Americans don't really understand what that is.

During my time in Congress, we did a lot of congressional delegations to Central and South America, and it was shocking to see the violence.

It was shocking to see the corruption, and it was shocking to see how much of an influence China had.

And when you do the Belt and Road initiative, it's basically China giving money to these countries, and they become then basically beholden to the Chinese government.

Is that fair to say?

DALY: Absolutely, and I think that is something that we can chat more about when we get into the usefulness of Trump's corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.

But part of the issue is you can't compete with China through threats alone, and especially when South America now has optionality and can hedge and can play both sides.

KATKO: I remember I went to Central America, it was shocking to learn how much of those assemblies were basically bought off by the Mexican drug cartels, and the corruption and violence that followed.

Is that a big issue still today?

DALY: Yes, and I think that that's another area in which the Monroe Doctrine is incredibly useful as a reminder that our hemisphere is vital.

It's as is winning this geopolitical competition against China and Russia, as we just talked about.

And so the administration is absolutely right about the Monroe Doctrine symbolically as it's important to prioritize our hemisphere.

But operationally, as a guide for what to do, and I think this is one of the questions, is what to do about the cartels that you're raising.

This is not the corollary, especially using militaristic, new imperial approaches is likely to fail, because the current challenge, including the challenge with the cartels, requires cooperation, not dominance, and I'm happy to talk through that.

KATKO: Sure, let's take Venezuela, because that's really the hot-button issue right now.

There's many tentacles with Venezuela, and it has a lot of implications.

Not only for Venezuela, but for the hemisphere.

For example, Venezuela was propping up the Cuban regime by all accounts economically, because after Russia and the others pulled out of Cuba for the most part, it was Venezuela who was kind of helping them survive.

But then you have Iran having their hand in there, you have China having their hand in, and you have Russia.

Can you explain to the viewers how those problems developed and what they really are right now?

DALY: Right, well, so Operation Absolute Resolve captured Maduro's tactically so successful.

Venezuelans are celebrating the end of a decade's long nightmare, and I think that you're right that Russia, you know, has right now, we're in a moment where there could be hope for alignment away from Russia, China.

There's huge pressure on the Cuban regime.

They're dependent on Venezuelan oil to keep their economy afloat.

So they're in their worst crisis, essentially ever with the thought that potentially the regime could fall.

But I think that what's really important to understand in this moment in Venezuela is that keeping Chavistas in power creates a really severe commitment problem, because once our military presence and leverage fades, as it will undoubtedly, as soon as needs require action elsewhere, the Chavistas are likely to just revert to their old ways with Russia and China alignment, as you mentioned.

Narco collusion, going back to what we were talking about before, and repression, because the Chavistas have reneged on countless deals.

They can't be trusted, and fighting imperialism and U.S.

exploitation of their oil is in their revolutionary DNA.

So I think that they'll just wait us out.

And so I think that the only thing that will work in Venezuela is a negotiated democracy now while we have maximum military pressure.

KATKO: Understood.

Now, again, so everyone's clear, the Monroe Doctrine and its subsequent interpretations is not a law.

It's not a legal theory.

It's more of a strategy, if you will, is that right?

DALY: Yeah, and it's been really -- it's evolved and it's sort of used in any way that the invoker wishes to use it, which is why it's not the most useful and why it often needs a corollary attached to it.

But I think that some of the main ideas of prioritizing our hemisphere, viewing any incursions into our hemisphere by other great powers -t hose incursions into our hemisphere by other great powers -t hose are useful concepts.

I think that there are broader strategic costs and risks to the Monroe Doctrine that we haven't talked about yet, one being that the Monroe Doctrine embodies this regional spheres of influence, and it largely means that you're abandoning great power competition.

And I think Xi would happily trade Venezuela for Taiwan.

Putin would make the same trade for Ukraine.

And so, a question is, you know, legitimizing these very spheres of influence model that threatens our allies in Europe and Asia - is that the rigth approach?

Because it's questioning whether we compete globally or essentially concede spheres to our adversaries, whether we maintain an alliance system based on shared interests and norms, or do we shift to a world where, especially in this corollary strongmen can do what they want in their backyards.

And so this approach could solidify a multipolar world, which would make the U.S.

significantly less safe.

KATKO: There's a lot more to pull on this, but unfortunately we're out of time.

I want to thank you so much for your insight.

It was very helpful, and you set the table perfectly for the Monroe or "Donroe Doctrine" discussion that we're going to have on the trapeze.

KATKO: On the trapeze this week is University of Missouri historian Jay Sexton, author of the book The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and the Nation in the 19th Century, and Andre Martinez Fernandez, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America at the Washington-based think tank, the Heritage Foundation.

Welcome, gentlemen.

Jay, I want to get right to you real quickly.

Tell us quickly about your book and what's the fundamental premise of it?

SEXTON: Well, my book looks at the history of the Monroe Doctrine, and this started off as a limited and reactive, defensive measure way back in 1823, and the Monroe administration was worried that European powers were about to intervene in Latin America, and they deemed this with good reason, I think, a threat to U.S.

security.

So they issued a warning.

They told Europe what it could not do.

It said, the Western Hemisphere was off-limits for future European colonization.

That's the original 1823 message.

What happens over time is that it begins to change and take on new meaning.

And later Americans, American presidents, transform this limited prohibition on European action into a call for a proactive strategy of the United States to exert more power and control in Latin America and in hemispheric affairs.

The key figure being Teddy Roosevelt.

So that's the big transition that the book looks at.

Of course, the story of the Monroe Doctrine in more recent times takes on new and, I think, unexpected meanings.

KATKO: Andre, let's take a step back for a second.

You know, we had a guest on just before you both came on, and she basically said that we kind of took our eye off the ball in the Western Hemisphere and allowed some bad things to develop after 9/11 because we were so worried about the Middle East.

Do you agree with that?

MARTINEZ FERNANDEZ: Yeah, I do.

We have definitely seen the consequences of U.S.

disengagement within really our hemisphere.

That's definitely aligned in part with the refocus onto other regions, including the Middle East after 9/11.

You've seen the drawing down of the U.S.

presence, particularly U.S.

military presence over that period of the past couple decades.

Loss of military basing, and also partnerships really fraying.

So I think you can definitely, to a significant degree, blame that refocus of Washington.

At the same time, there was also certainly a regional pushback that was, I think, another prompting factor where anti-American leadership came to power and started prompting this exit for particularly the U.S.

military presence, but really soured relations broadly with the United States.

KATKO: Jay, what's your thought?

SEXTON: Yeah, I think that's broadly correct.

I mean, I would say that also in the last 25, 30 years, one of the trend lines is that the relative power of the United States has declined as new rivals have assumed more power and more wealth.

And so the story that you see in the hemisphere, which we just heard about, is quite similar to the story that you see elsewhere around the world.

So as this old 1945 world order that the United States itself took the leading role in creating and establishing, as it unravels, the big question is, what's going to replace it?

I think we have heard from the Trump administration that one of the things that's going to replace it is the old idea of spheres of influence, the old symbolism of the Monroe Doctrine.

It's going to be dusted off, it's going to be given new meaning, and American foreign policy will look rather different than it had before.

I think there will be - last point here-a wider debate both around the world, but also within the United States and within U.S.

domestic politics about what the future of American foreign policy is going to look like.

And the history of the Monroe Doctrine is actually that.

It's the history of Americans in the United States fighting about its meaning and devising new policies to advance U.S.

interests.

And I think we should welcome that process as the old rules of the road are giving way to something new.

KATKO: Andre, the United States going into Venezuela - good idea or a bad idea?

MARTINEZ FERNANDEZ: I think it's a good idea.

I think it's allowing a narco-dictatorship to weaponize drugs and mass migration against the United States and our hemisphere - its neighbors very much included within that - is a very destructive status quo that taking out Nicolás Maduro has upended.

And now this opportunity to shift the remnants of this regime towards a stable transition that restores freedom, security, and stability to Venezuela is a massive opportunity, which we really had very little path towards achieving that with Nicolás Maduro continuing in power.

KATKO: So, Jay, to borrow a bad phrase from an old song, "Too Much, Too Little, Too Late.

It seems we let this fester in Venezuela far too long.

I mean, we knew Russia had its tentacles in there.

We knew Iran was getting its tentacles in.

We know China has its tentacles in there.

We know their oil's going to Cuba, and probably illegally.

And we seem to have let it fester too long.

Do you agree with that?

SEXTON: Well, I agree that those were troubling developments, but there's risks in taking action, as I think everyone is well aware of.

The question is, do the risks of the status quo - troubling though it is - justify the risks of moving forward?

Time will tell on that.

And obviously, the Trump administration has pursued at least initially a limited action of taking out the head honcho, just President Maduro, but leaving, as we just heard, the regime in place.

And the gamble is that the regime will be more pliable and tractable and will do the bidding that comes from Washington, and that perhaps at some point there will be a transition into a more democratic and stable government.

There's no guarantees that this is going to unfold the way I just described it.

And if you look at the history of the Monroe Doctrine, and the history of interventions in Latin America - particularly in the early 20th century, which I think the logic underpinning Trump's action really resembles that of Theodore Roosevelt more than any of his predecessors - those started off as limited interventions, but they had a way of escalating into protracted occupations that were costly and very unpopular at home.

Now, I know that the administration does not want to do that, but it is leaving that possibility on the table, and this will become, I think, an important issue in American politics if it continues to escalate along the terms as past interventions have.

KATKO: Should there be any sort of guardrails around the Monroe Doctrine legislatively?

I know it's a political theory, or a foreign policy theory.

Should we have guardrails?

SEXTON: Yeah, I think so.

And I think Congress, historically, has been very, very deliberate about not giving a blank check or not giving congressional endorsement of the Monroe Doctrine.

That was something that was a big issue in the days of Teddy Roosevelt, because they were concerned that the intervention would run amok, and it would go from one place to the next.

So I think that's important, and just the general idea, which you don't need to hear about, is about the diminishment of Congress in the United States today.

To restore that muscle, I think, is good and should be welcome, particularly when it relates to foreign affairs.

KATKO: Andre, what do you think?

MARTINEZ FERNANDEZ: I mean, I, you know, I'm concerned with the direction that a lot of what Congress is talking about and doing on whether it's, you know, the broader Monroe Doctrine or Venezuela, as far as limitations like this War Powers Resolution.

I think a lot of it is detached from the realities of, A, you know, the consequences of U.S.

disengagement that we've seen, and what the consequences of handcuffing the administration on Venezuela, on these other challenges, could have.

You know, certainly Congress has had a challenge as far as relevance and asserting its role, but I think along that time, we've also seen it very, very difficult for it to formulate reasoned - and particularly when it comes to the international sphere - an approach and legislation that is responsive to the realities on the ground.

And I think that's in part why you've had so much ceded to the executive as far as these foreign policy formulations.

It's for me as someone who focuses on Latin America I always find it's very difficult to understand how the same voices who are calling for sending dramatic military escalation in Europe against Russia, or engagement in the Middle East against Iran and other targets, then look at what's happening in our hemisphere and say, well, that's - we can't have any involvement there, and we need to put up all the guardrails.

I think that there's a real disconnect, not only with their positioning broadly on these issues, but with the interests of the American people.

KATKO: Okay, Jay Sexton from the University of Missouri and Andre Martinez Fernandez from the Heritage Foundation, thanks so much for your time and wonderful discussion.

Now it's time for My Take.

As America grew in size, economic strength, and military influence, it became clear that stability in our hemisphere required clear boundaries.

Foreign powers learned that if they interfered in the Americas, they would have to answer to the United States.

The Cuban Missile Crisis stands as a powerful reminder of how seriously that principle has been taken.

Has it been perfect?

Of course not, but there's no denying that imperial-minded European powers have long thought twice before overplaying their hand in the Western Hemisphere.

Even so, those same powers, along with Iran, Russia, and China, have tested the limits of U.S.

patience by extending their influence deep into Venezuela.

Going forward, we as a country need to do a better job of preventing threats from reaching that point by more closely monitoring the actions of bad actors as they develop.

History shows that when you give an inch, hostile powers will take a mile, and by any measure, that is precisely why the Monroe Doctrine in some form still matters.

And that's My Take.

Well, that's all for this week.

To send in your comments for the show or to see "Balancing Act" extras and exclusives, follow us on social media, or go to BalancingActWithJohnKatko.com.

Thank you for joining us, and remember, in the circus that is politics, there's always a "Balancing Act".

I'm John Katko.

We'll see you next week, America.

♪ ♪