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♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ KATKO: Welcome, America, to "Balancing Act", the show that aims to tame the political circus of two-party politics.

I'm John Katko.

This week: NATO.

Should the U.S.

draw the line?

In the center ring, we'll speak with former U.S.

Ambassador to NATO, Douglas Lute.

On the trapeze, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO, Ian Brzezinski, and the Cato Institute's Justin Logan take swings at the issue.

Then, I'll give you my take.

And then, did you know a NATO ally proves you don't need a big army to play a big role?

But first, let's walk the tightrope.

♪ ♪ NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is a political and military alliance of 32 member nations across North America and Europe.

It's built around one central promise: An attack on one is an attack on all.

Created in 1949 in the shadow of World War II and the start of the Cold War, the mission was clear: Prevent another catastrophic war in Europe, keep the United States engaged in European security, and deter the Soviet Union from pushing farther west.

The promise became known as Article 5 of the treaty.

But Article 5 is ambiguous by design.

Surprisingly, it does not automatically require every NATO country to go to war.

Each ally agrees to assist the country that was attacked, but the treaty states each nation must take such action as it deems necessary, including, but not limited to, the use of armed force.

In essence, NATO makes a solemn promise to respond, but each member still has room to decide what their response looks like.

That allows each member to make a common promise without giving up all national control.

And for decades, that promise helped do what NATO was created to do.

And after the terrorist attacks of September 11, NATO invoked Article 5 for the first and only time in its history, standing with the United States.

NATO remains a standing security alliance to this day, but the alliance is under strain.

For years, American presidents from both parties have complained that Europe was not carrying enough of the load.

In 2014, NATO allies agreed to move toward spending at least 2% of their economy on defense.

At the time, only a few met the mark.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine changed that conversation dramatically.

Ukraine is not a member of NATO, so Article 5 does not apply.

But the invasion reminded NATO why it exists in the first place: To deter Russia, defend its members, and prevent wider war in Europe.

NATO reports all allies have now reached or exceeded that Percent goal.

And the alliance is committed to a much larger target, that is, 5% of GDP for defense and security-related spending by 2035.

President Trump has pushed his argument harder than anyone.

He's even suggested that America might not defend allies that don't spend enough.

Critics say that weakens the very deterrent NATO was built upon.

Supporters say his pressure forced allies to get serious once and for all.

And America's frustration only grew during the Iran crisis, when some NATO allies were reluctant to support U.S.

operations involving bases or airspace.

Here, however, the distinction matters.

If America is attacked, NATO allies are expected to respond.

But if America is launching or considering action outside the NATO theater, allies have far more room to say no.

Today, NATO is being tested.

America is more impatient.

Europe is rearming.

And the assumption that the United States will always carry the alliance, no matter what, is being challenged.

So should the U.S.

draw the line on NATO?

Let's bring that question into the center ring.

Joining with me now in the center ring is former Ambassador to NATO under Presidents Bush and Obama, Douglas Lute.

Ambassador, it's great to see you again.

I remember seeing you when I was on a congressional delegation back in the day.

LUTE: I remember your visit.

>KATKO: Good, and let's get right at it.

What part of NATO's original mission still matters most today in this modern world?

LUTE: Well, I think the Original mission, and by original, of course, we're talking about 1949, when the Washington Treaty, the NATO treaty, was signed.

The original mission was the security of the North Atlantic area.

So stretching from Europe all the way across the Atlantic to the U.S.

and Canada.

That mission still applies.

It may not apply in exactly the same ways.

So, for example, we don't expect a large Soviet Union land invasion across the plains of Western Europe.

But there are still security threats.

KATKO: So when you were ambassador, when Russia seized Crimea in 2014, what did NATO learn about its post-Cold War purpose?

Was it tweaked at all since then?

LUTE: Well, I think 2014, you know, the previous invasion of Ukraine by Russia, reminded NATO that its core purpose still matters.

And that there are still, despite sort of 20 years of a peace dividend, or a time when Europe was not really threatened by a military power, that military power still exists around the world.

And Vladimir Putin's invasion in 2014, and then amplified by his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in '22, really was a sort of harsh wake-up call for NATO.

KATKO: So Article 5 is not an automatic mechanism, as many people think it is.

Is that ambiguity that's built into Article 5 a strength or a weakness, do you think?

LUTE: Well, look, the purpose of Article 5, and the overall purpose of NATO, is to prevent war, right?

So the strength of the military alliance, the promise that an attack on one will be responded to by others, all of that is designed to get into the head of a potential adversary and cause that potential adversary to reason that it does not make sense to attack NATO.

So in that sense, a touch of ambiguity about exactly what the response would be, and exactly who would respond when, could complicate a potential opponent's calculus and could add to deterrence.

And therefore, it could be useful.

In fact, it has effectively served NATO well for now approaching 80 years.

KATKO: So let's talk about what's going on right now, and that's with respect to Russia.

Russia has definitely been stepping over the line a little bit, and the most recent Russian drone incident in Romania is the best example.

When that happens, how does NATO, as a group, decide whether something's an accident, a provocation, or an attack requiring a response like what happened in Romania?

What's the mechanism for that?

LUTE: Right, well, Article 5 itself, the key words in Article 5 are "armed attack."

So an armed attack on one ally shall be considered by others as an attack on them.

SO the first definition matters, and some things clearly separate out.

So a disinformation campaign, election interference, even some minor cyber disruptions don't rise to the level of armed attack.

So we can set those aside.

And you mentioned 9/11.

There was some question in the first 24 hours after 9/11 whether the al-Qaida attack on New York and Washington, and in the skies over Pennsylvania, constituted an armed attack.

Now, it only took NATO a couple of hours to sort through that, and they did declare that Article 5 applies.

But that's the clear threshold: armed attack.

For incidents like we've seen recently along the eastern flank of NATO, which could be seen mostly as spillover effects from the Ukraine war, including most recently this attack by apparently a Russian drone, which went astray and ended up striking an apartment building in Romania, I don't think that the alliance would consider that an armed attack because it would look at the attack itself, the action, the physical action, but it would also look at the intent.

And I don't think that in this case you have an intent to invade or attack an ally.

KATKO: So let's talk about the big elephant in the room with respect to the United States' view of NATO, and that is the funding mechanism.

it seems like the United States has always had a disproportionate share of the burden.

And it seems President Trump publicly pressured NATO allies to spend more on defense.

He wasn't the first, because, my gosh, way back when, even Eisenhower said that.

But how did things change after Trump started exerting the pressure?

Did that cause them to commit, or was it the combination of Trump and Russia invading Ukraine again?

LUTE: Sometimes, John -- I served under President Obama, and the first pledge by NATO leaders to increase defense spending was actually in 2014 under President Obama.

This is the now somewhat famous 2% pledge.

>> KATKO: That was Shaw' first INCURTION into Ukraine.

That was a wake-up call.

LUTE: That's right.

So after the wake-up call, the leaders came to an agreement to move toward 2% of GDP committed to defense.

At that time, there were only three allies of the 28 at the time.

Only three were at or above 2%.

So sometimes I take the question, you know, now that President Trump's on the scene and he has upped the rhetoric, upped the demands on NATO allies to the point where they're now committed to 3.5%.

Who's more responsible?

Was it President Obama or President Trump?

And then you have this sort of partisan debate.

And my quick reply to that is, you've got the wrong president.

President Vladimir Putin is the president most responsible for the rise in defense spending.

Whether it started at 2% and today it's at 5%, I think the very clear and obvious military danger, conventional military danger, presented by Putin, first in 2014 and then later in 2022, he is the main driver behind the increased defense spending.

KATKO: Necessity is the mother of invention, as always, right?

LUTE: No question.

KATKO: Just looking into your crystal ball going forward, how do you think the health of NATO is going to be in the years going forward?

We've got about a minute left.

>> LUTE: Well, look, NATO is, I think, coping with the challenge from the east.

What's new today, and in fact I think in a way that NATO has not confronted before in its over 75 years of history, is the challenge from the West.

And that is the challenge from Washington, and in particular from the Trump administration.

So I think NATO will hold together because it's in the nations' interest.

The 32 members have an interest in mutual defense.

But there's no question that today NATO is under stresses that it has not seen before.

KATKO: Lastly, very quickly, should the U.S.

draw the line?

That's kind of the theme of the show today.

And where should America press allies harder?

And where could drawing the line too sharply weaken NATO?

LUTE: Look, I think the Trump administration has done a responsible thing, and that is to call on allies to take greater responsibility, a greater lead, in the conventional defense of Europe.

So I think that line makes sense.

What does not make sense, which I think would be moving too far across the line, would be to threaten that America would leave the alliance or would simply no longer have a commitment to backstop European allies.

So this is a delicate adjustment that's taking place.

Allies should be in the lead, but the U.S.

needs to be there as well.

KATKO: Ambassador Douglas Lute, thank you so much for a great conversation.

It's nice to see you again.

LUTE: Good to be with you.

♪ ♪ KATKO: Joining me on the trapeze is former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO, and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, Ian Brzezinski, and from the Cato Institute, foreign policy expert Justin Logan.

Welcome, gentlemen.

I want to get right into it.

Ian, NATO, since its inception until today, has it worked?

IAN BRZEZINSKI: It has been history's most successful military alliance, hands down.

It won the Cold War without firing a shot.

It brought peace to the Balkans.

And it demonstrated its operational effectiveness over a decade in Iraq and Afghanistan.

There is no military coalition that's been able to as effectively put lead downrange as NATO.

And this isn't an organization that not only is militarily effective, but it's backed by some $55 trillion to $60 trillion in economic weight.

It brings the power of political legitimacy.

That's so important.

You know, that's the kind of arsenal you want to have when you're dealing with the challenges of today, be it in Europe, the Middle East, the Indo-Pacific, or elsewhere.

KATKO: So, Justin, it's not perfect.

If it was perfect, we wouldn't be talking about it today on the show.

So tell me, what are your biggest concerns with NATO as it's currently operating?

LOGAN: Well, in a certain sense, we need to rewind a little bit.

And I know that's an annoying think tank guy thing to do.

But we need to ask: What is the central U.S.

interest in Europe?

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, what used to be about countries in the North Atlantic, now has taken on inertia all its own.

And I think the central U.S.

interest in Europe is in keeping European power divided.

We didn't want Wilhelmine Germany to dominate Europe.

We certainly didn't want Germany to dominate Europe.

And we didn't want the Soviet Soviet Union to dominate Europe.

Is there a candidate in the modern day that threatens to dominate Europe?

I think the answer is no.

And if the answer is no, then if you look at non-U.S.

NATO members, they comprise between five and ten times Russia's GDP.

They spend more on the military than Russia does.

And Europe should be really doing almost everything for its own defense without the United States playing the central role in continental security.

KATKO: So, Ian, what are your thoughts about that?

BRZEZINSKI: You know, I guess I kind of disagree.

I think the United States should play a central role.

When the United States didn't play a central role, you go back, we had World War I and World War II.

We've had the most sustained period of peace and prosperity in Europe over the last seven to eight decades, largely because of American leadership.

And it's cheap.

I mean, our commitment to Europe today, through military force structure, is about 6% of the number of personnel we have in uniform.

It's about 60,000 based forces out of a force of 1.3 million.

That's an easy investment for the high returns we get in our relationship with Europe.

First, it sustains peace and economic growth in Europe.

We have $400 trillion in investment, and these are the allies who stand with us.

You know, when we go off on our adventures, be it in Afghanistan or Iraq.

It's a good investment, it's going to give us solid returns.

KATKO: So, Justin, what would you envision NATO looking like in the perfect world for you?

JUSTIN LOGAN: Well, it would essentially be a European alliance.

I mean, I think it's quite right.

Ambassador Brzezinski talks about the extent to which there has been peace and prosperity in Europe.

And guess who has a profound interest in that peace and prosperity?

Big, powerful, important countries: France, Germany, the United Kingdom.

And so those countries should be carrying the load for European security.

I disagree somewhat that it's a sort of cheap commitment.

The best estimate that we have of the U.S.

commitment to Europe, including the forces, the force structure designed to support the mission, support troops, et cetera, is it's about $100 billion per year.

To do so, the United States pays every year and if we've noticed, the United States is $40 trillion in debt.

It's adding to that debt at the rate of $2 trillion per year.

And the biggest items in the federal budget-health care, Social Security, and interest on the debt-don't appear amenable to policy fixes at any point in the immediate future.

So I think this is a moment where Europe looks like it is prepared to step up.

But they're not going to do so unless Americans force them to Social Security, and interest on the debt-don't appear amenable to policy fixes at any point in the immediate future.

So I think this is a moment where Europe looks like it is prepared to step up.

But they're not going to do so unless Americans force them to do so.

KATKO: So, Justin, if you have troop withdrawals, just briefly, would you think we should still be a part of NATO?

LOGAN: I mean, I think that's the sort of philosophical question, right?

Historically, people have said we need to withdraw from NATO, or we can't withdraw from NATO.

I think the big question is the resource commitment.

Again, it's a big resource commitment from the United States.

It's a big attention draw from the United States.

And the U.S.

involvement in the war in Ukraine, for example, has drawn down a number of resources that would be crucial to deterring or fighting any conflict, for example, in the Indo-Pacific.

And so I think if we restructured the transatlantic relationship such that Europe was the leader in European security -that is to say, the current U.S.

allies did the bulk of especially conventional deterrence in Europe -the United States could save real money and real resources for priorities elsewhere in the world and to bring down what is a catastrophically damaging debt and deficit at home.

KATKO: Ian, what's your take about that?

I mean, you know, this is part of a broader discussion that's been front and center lately with NATO.

that is, America has always carried a disproportionate share.

So it sounds like what Justin's saying is we should dramatically reduce our involvement in NATO.

Do you agree that we should tweak it, at least as far as our financial commitment, or at least making sure that the member countries raise theirs?

BRZEZINSKI: No, I just disagree with Justin.

I mean, you know, $100 billion that may be allocated toward forces that are in Europe and that could be deployed to Europe in time of need are forces that also serve our interests in the Middle East and elsewhere around the world.

Again, you know, the NATO relationship is a force multiplier for the United States.

For every troop we put in Afghanistan, there were European troops.

Excuse me.

For every three troops we put in Afghanistan, it was complemented by a European.

That was three Americans that didn't have to go.

We had at one time 40,000 European troops in Afghanistan.

So 120,000 Americans didn't have to go.

You know, if we were to reduce our force posture, we're going to reduce the credibility of our leadership.

And we're going to weaken NATO because NATO doesn't work without strong U.S.

leadership.

And again, I've got to say, for 60,000 personnel in Europe, it's a very cheap investment for a very high return in a relationship that is our most important relationship globally.

It'll be a long time before the Indo-Pacific region becomes as important to the United States as Europe does.

And moreover, right now is a time we should be increasing our force posture there, not reducing it.

The debate over European burden-sharing is over.

Europeans are spending more.

We need to encourage them to spend smarter and more effectively.

But that debate is over.

What we should be doing now is making sure that that force evolves into one that is a truly effective deterrent against aggression, particularly today from Russia.

KATKO: So, just to stick with you, just one quick second.

Yes-or-no answer because we're out of time here.

Will Trump's policies ultimately serve to strengthen or weaken NATO overall?

BRZEZINSKI: Trump's policies right now are weakening NATO.

It's unfortunate and costly and risky.

But I'm confident there's enough American support, public support, congressional support, that our course will change in the next administration.

KATKO: Briefly, Justin?

LOGAN: I think it's changing the burden.

Dwight Eisenhower said in 1951 that if all U.S.

troops devoted to the defense of Europe hadn't been withdrawn in ten years, the whole project would have been a failure.

That burden needs to push onto the Europeans.

KATKO: Thank you both for being a part of a great conversation, gentlemen.

♪ ♪ KATKO: NATO has served as a crucial deterrent to Russian aggression since its creation.

And in that regard, it's been remarkably successful.

That success has been good not only for Western Europe, but also for America's strategic and massive economic interests.

But over time, many NATO countries became far too comfortable, letting the Imoted States carry a disproportionately large share of the costs.

In some ways, America never fully moved out of the post-World War II mindset of helping Europe rebuild and defend itself.

Now, with Russia once again a major threat, Western European countries are scrambling to increase defense spending and take on more responsibility.

And it's high time that they've done so.

Going forward, the United States needs to make sure NATO has real mechanisms in place so that every member carries its fair share of the joint defense.

NATO has worked, and it can continue to work, but only if the burden is shared more fairly and Europe stops relying so heavily on its rich uncle from across the pond.

And that's my take.

♪ ♪ Did you know that Iceland is a founding member of NATO but has no standing army?

Iceland joined NATO in 1949, but its contribution has always looked a little different.

Its greatest asset is its strategic geography in the North North Atlantic.

While it does have a Coast Guard, air defense support, and host nation responsibilities, Iceland has been referred to as an unsinkable aircraft carrier.

So in NATO, not every ally brings the same kind of muscle to the table.

For Iceland, its strongest suit fulfills real estate's oldest mantra: Location, location, location.

And now you do know.

♪ ♪ That's all for this week, folks.

To send in your comments for the show, or to see "Balancing Act" extras and exclusives, follow us on social media or go to balancingactwithjohnkatko.com.

Thank you for joining us.

And remember, in the circus that is politics, there's always a "Balancing Act".

I'm John Katko.

We'll see you next week, America.

♪ ♪ With Pomeroy markers, history is based on the facts, and vetted by professional historians.

Over 3,000 installed nationwide, from Maine to Florida, to California, to Minnesota, to Texas, and Alaska.

Since 2006, our markers have helped people celebrate community history.

Marker grant program information available at wgpfoundation.org.

♪ It takes time to craft a piece of furniture and to craft a 125-year legacy.

It takes patience to execute every detail the right way.

And it takes family working to bring out the best in each other over generations.

This is Stickley, the furniture that serves generations of family.

Maturing with time, rewarding patience, and celebrating every detail.

This is what excellence means to us.

♪ ♪ On Masterpiece Mystery... Life rarely turns out the way we expect.

You're all a loose end.

Hello, Geordie.

We've got a body, boss.

It's hard to tell whether he's more copper or vicar sometimes.

I think I might be a bit lost.

God has a will, and so do we.

I need time to think and pray.

Hope first, I ride.

The final season of Grantchester on Masterpiece Mystery.

♪ ♪